§1. Why metals, and why steel above all [00:03]
Yesterday I started out. Today we're going to talk about materials, but we're going to talk about metals. What about polymers? Why do we talk about ceramics? Why are we talking about ceramics as structural materials? Ceramics are brittle, useful for many things, higher melting temperatures than metals in general. Polymers — why don't we use polymers for special materials? We do use them in structural applications: trash cans, little toys, all kinds of things, but not really critical things.
Metals have this property called ductility, and there's a whole bunch of metals. I listed these metals for a particular reason — they are the ones that show up on this graph, which is in a handout that will show up on Stellar. It turns out 95 pounds out of every 100 pounds of metal made in the world is steel. Aluminum is less than two percent. Copper's over one percent. Most of the zinc is used to coat the steel for protection, because the second Achilles heel of steel — aside from the first, which we'll get to — is that steel's heavy. You have to use lots of zinc, millions of tons of zinc, to protect the hundreds of millions of tons of steel.
Zinc is a byproduct of copper. Lead has tremendous atmospheric corrosion resistance. The first water pipes in England were lead. The Romans used lead. We used to make our plumbing out of lead. Now we don't even allow it to be in the solder of our plumbing joints. Nickel is expensive but it's critical, and we use it in places where other common materials won't do. Magnesium, titanium — most of the magnesium goes into aluminum.
There are lots of different types of metals. If we take iron, or any one of these, the properties of a metal are strength, ductility, toughness, and cost. Those are the mechanical properties in particular, except cost, which is an economic property. Steel is right out there at the top, along with cobalt alloys, copper, and nickel. But all those others have much higher cost. The closest to steel is copper, which costs about eight times more.
So steel has low cost plus strength, ductility, and toughness. That's why it's used. In terms of processing, we can fabricate steel lots of different ways, and relatively easily compared to a lot of metals. It's easy to recycle. Iron is one of the most abundant elements in the earth's crust. And there are performance properties too. Corrosion: steel's not so great. Fracture and fatigue: steel is actually pretty good. Some people define materials science and engineering as processing, structure, properties, and performance. Here are three of the four. And for structural materials, iron just rises to the top — not by a small percentage. It's 95 percent of all metals made.
My overall summary of yesterday — maybe this isn't what you got, but — we use metals for structures because of fracture resistance. We use steel the most because of the combination of properties. Materials are not chosen because of a single property. It's a sweep of properties.
§2. Boutique materials and the limits of "lightest" [05:27]
One of the biggest fallacies in the area of people overselling materials is that they say, "Oh, I just got the lightest material in the world." The lightest material in the world is an aerogel. Anyone ever heard of aerogel before? What's an aerogel?
Student: [Inaudible response about silicon-oxygen bonds.]
Yeah, it's a silicon-oxygen bond. It's made in what we call a sol-gel process. And it's a cellular material. Go look right at the end of the Infinite Corridor. You turn down to go to building 16 — there's a display case across from Professor Gibson's office. She's the world's expert in cellular materials, and she's done this display case. She's got a little cube of aerogel. You have to protect it from the atmosphere because the moisture in the air will dissolve it. It's sort of like lightweight Jell-O without the water. Jell-O is just a protein cellular structure with water in between.
An aerogel is the lightest material. It has about 10 percent of the density of water, or even less in some cases. The thing is, if you blow on it, it'll collapse. So it's not exactly a structural material, but it's the lightest in the world. And because people found something that was lightweight, they started spending millions of dollars on aerogels as if they had an application for it. Today, twenty-five years later, they still don't have an application for it. Why not go spend millions of dollars doing research on something useless? It does have good insulation properties, as long as you're working in the Atacama Desert in Chile, where there's no moisture in the air. Or maybe up in space.
Jim Williams — Jim was head of aircraft engines for General Electric in Cincinnati — calls them boutique materials. They have an application, or maybe even three applications, but they're not high-volume materials. When you're talking about lots of things, like a pipeline, you work with what you have.
§3. Titanium, the X-33 tank, and Soviet submarines [08:20]
I said steel is heavy. To give you an idea: [Tom holds up a steel sample.] this is a piece of one-inch steel made about thirty years ago. [Tom holds up a second sample.] This is a piece of two-inch-thick titanium electroslag weld made at our Graduate Center when we were looking at trying to build a titanium submarine. Why have we not built a titanium submarine? A long time ago the Soviets did that. The main source of titanium — it's like aluminum, it's about the fifth most abundant element in the Earth's crust. Titanium is not scarce.
We use lots of titanium dioxide — all the white in this room, it's titanium dioxide. But it takes a lot of energy to refine titanium to its metallic state. It also doesn't have very good fracture toughness. It is lightweight, and the SR-71 had titanium skin, because when you're flying at a hundred thousand feet at Mach 3, the skin temperature is above the temperature at which aluminum will maintain its strength. The Concorde supersonic jet didn't fly on speed; it flew on skin temperature. Colder day, fly better across the Atlantic.
I flew the Concorde once. I paid the extra three-thousand-dollar super-first-class ticket — this was twenty years ago — and it was the filthiest plane I've ever been on. They didn't have any extra aircraft so they didn't maintain it very well. Small seats. Everybody was in super first class because everybody was bored at once. Long story.
[Tom holds up a composite sample.] This is a piece of the X-33 space plane liquid hydrogen tank. Carbon-carbon composite, Nomex honeycomb. That material cost twelve thousand dollars a pound. It's light, but at twelve thousand dollars a pound — as fabricated, a titanium submarine is only about a hundred times the cost of an HY-100 submarine. What are you paying for the hull of an HY-100 submarine right now? Probably twenty-five or thirty dollars a pound. So do you want to start paying three thousand bucks a pound to protect our subs? You can do it.
But there were other reasons. Why did the Soviets build their titanium subs? They had funny money. No — actually, they had cracks. My first research project at MIT in 1977 was Office of Naval Research. I got involved in a number of things at David Taylor [Naval Ship R&D Center]. Congress was really upset that the Soviets were doing a leapfrog in technology. At the time, they were concerned because this sub could go faster underwater than our destroyers could go on the surface. And they could dive deeper than the collapse depth of our depth charges. People thought we'd never be able to attack them.
Well, it turns out they developed cracks. There's something called creep-fatigue interaction. I remember guys at the Naval Research Laboratory at one of these conferences — how do they solve the creep-fatigue interactions? I said, I don't know. Well, it turns out they didn't. The Naval Research Laboratory had done all kinds of studies on this. It was one of the reasons why they couldn't recommend, even if you had the money, going to build a titanium submarine. But that's the difference between a political decision in the former Soviet Union — they wanted to leapfrog, even though no one's going to tell the top brass that even if we build it, the doggone thing is full of cracks. They were full of cracks. It had nothing to do with economics. They had an economic system they could never justify what they did with anyway.
§4. Friction stir welding and additive manufacturing [13:59]
There are lots of joining technologies for other things. [Tom holds up a friction stir weld sample.] This is a piece of friction-stir-welded aluminum. A student came to me, wanted to work for NASA. This is how they put together part of the Space Shuttle main tank. Distortion-free, or relatively distortion-free, friction stir weld. Boeing went out and spent ten million dollars building a friction stir welding machine for some of their structures, because a welded joint is always lighter than a bolted joint.
We're supposed to talk about welding and welding metallurgy. There are other technologies around today — you hear about additive manufacturing. One of my students did her thesis when peace broke out in the early 90s with the former Soviet Union.
During the Star Wars buildup in the mid 80s, there was lots of money for lots of things. The US Navy at White Oak, Maryland, was developing — spent a quarter billion dollars developing — a particle beam weapon. This was to be a relativistic electron beam, millions of electron volts, that if there was a cruise missile or an Exocet missile coming in to attack the ship, this was to take it out. This was after the Falklands War, when the French Exocet missile hit the British destroyer HMS Sheffield and destroyed the ship. The reason it destroyed the ship had nothing to do with the explosive charge of the Exocet or setting off the charges. It was the fact that the ship had an aluminum superstructure, and the superstructure caught on fire. You can't put out the fire, and the whole thing burned.
You might say, oh, those silly British. Well, before that, the original JFK — the Forrestal-class carrier — the destroyer Belknap ran into the JFK on maneuvers. He was right underneath one of the aircraft elevators, and some jet fuel dropped down on top of the Belknap and ignited the superstructure. It wiped out the Belknap. The joke at the time was: the gallon of jet fuel beat the Exocet missile.
I was around at David Taylor in the 1980s when they were trying to go from aluminum superstructures to waffle steel construction — cellular superstructure that would be lightweight. The problem with steel is it's heavy, and it corrodes. The Navy uses a steel-aluminum transition joint. All this stuff is part of why we get to study welding metallurgy.
§5. The welding metallurgy bookshelf [17:49]
I told you you have to study it because NAFSA says so. It's supposed to be welding metallurgy. [Tom displays a stack of books.] These are the books I took off my shelf on welding metallurgy. This is the oldest. The fourth edition is from 1983, but the original edition was from the 1940s — The Weldability of Steels. Bob Stout was a fabulous professor at Lehigh University when I worked at Bethlehem Steel. John Gross was head of research. Levi and John Gross at the steel companies used to call aluminum a near-metal, because aluminum doesn't have the same fracture toughness and things like that.
[Tom picks up next book.] This is George Linnert — George has been passed by a long time. This is from the 1960s. Welding Metallurgy — guess how many volumes? Two volumes. This has sold, since the 1960s, four hundred thousand copies as of ten years ago. You want to make some money? Write a book on welding metallurgy. [Tom picks up next book.] This is the latest one, 2015: Sindo Kou, professor at Ohio State.
Almost any book on steel fracture will have a picture of the Schenectady. [Tom searches through books.] I can't find it. But I'll show you where it came from. This is a 1946 report on an investigation on the design and methods of construction of welded steel merchant vessels. Here's the Schenectady. Brittle fracture.
This is the final report of the board of investigation convened by Order of the Secretary of the Navy. One Christmas — my graduation was over Christmas — I was over at the MIT library book sale of books they were going to get rid of. I bought this for two bucks, and it's been sort of one of my prized possessions. It is the final report. It was in the MIT libraries from 1947 until just a few years ago. James Forrestal, Secretary. They had a structural failure history.
Of six thousand ships, the number that had serious structural problems was huge — like a thousand, eleven hundred ships with major structural failures. Six or seven broke up completely in two. There's the picture of the Schenectady, but there's also the picture of the SS Manhattan, which is right here. This happened not at dry dock, but out in the middle of the ocean.
How am I going to go through all these books? The reason I bought them is because there is no single course on a lot of welding. NAFSA — this is sort of like my little questions about what to teach. They say you're supposed to have a course in welding metallurgy, but they don't tell you what's supposed to be in the course.
§6. What's in the textbooks vs. what we still see [23:59]
Of all these books, there are about half a dozen different ways to think of welding metallurgy. For example, Sindo Kou — very knowledgeable guy, who has received more awards from the American Welding Society than any person alive or dead — has a list of the problems of weldability of steels, or welding in general. The interesting thing to me when I looked at this last week was to look at the topics. He has fabrication-related topics, and service-related effects. The fabrication-related defects are hot cracking, warm cracking, cold cracking, hydrogen-induced cracking, process control, and others. He goes through these things in some detail.
But I've been doing this stuff for forty years, and most of these I have never seen as a real service problem. When the jet age was coming up in the 1950s and 1960s, and we were developing all kinds of new alloys for jet engines, a lot of these types of cracking were very prevalent fifty, sixty years ago, but they're not prevalent today. You choose the compositions properly.
[Tom moves to the phase diagram.] A phase diagram is just plotting temperature versus composition of a metallic alloy. I'm going to show you one for steel in a little bit. For alloys — this is called the eutectic. It's the lowest melting alloy, and it's about four percent copper. Four percent copper in aluminum dissolves in and lowers the melting point by over a hundred degrees centigrade. 2024 alloy is somewhere over here, and it starts to solidify around here, at what we call the liquidus line. In this region I have liquid plus solid. Over here I have liquid plus another solid. We might call this alpha and we might call this solid theta — different crystal structures. This one's actually aluminum-free copper.
The problem is, it starts to solidify here and it doesn't finish solidifying until here. Things solidify over a range of temperatures. If you've ever made homemade ice cream with the old-fashioned crank, you use salt and ice. Both of those are solids at room temperature, but you put them together and the salt will melt the ice. That's what we do on the sidewalks in the winter, right? When they alloy together, the salt plus the ice forms a low-melting salt water, which melts below zero degrees Celsius. Same thing with aluminum and copper.
If you have something that melts over a long range of temperature, this is called the mushy zone. It's like a Slurpee. And if I now have the thermal contraction stresses — as the whole thing is cooling down — that Slurpee just gets pulled apart, and you end up with cracks.
Student: Could you say that again?
As it cools, it pulls apart and cracks.
Student: You said that was a different kind of welding at the top of your list?
I said most of the things that John is going to talk about in this book — it has a whole chapter on hot cracking, solidification cracking, heat-affected cracking — frankly, eighty percent of this book is about problems we have known in the past that we don't experience anymore, because the aluminum companies don't make alloys and advertise them unless they've already solved this.
The steels generally don't have this BCC heat-affected zone equation, because iron-based alloys just don't have this. I have seen weld solidification cracking when you're trying to weld over a high-phosphorus paint. The problem they reproduce is hydrogen-induced surface cracking, and we're going to go over that as a base case, because I've seen this half a dozen times even though Stout wrote this book about how to avoid hydrogen-induced cracking. Seventy, eighty years later, we still see the Sea Wolf submarine that I talked about have hydrogen-induced cracking.
We're going to go over that, because it's still a problem. People still don't follow the welding procedures, and they still fall off the cliff with hydrogen-induced cracking. My point is, most of what's in this book on welding metallurgy is a compendium of what John has worked on for the last forty years. But that doesn't mean it's the practical things you really need to know. This is the science of all the different ways a weld can go wrong, but I'm not going to spend all that time on some of these things — they're here and we know about them, but we've learned to fix them. It's the ones we still trip on every day.
Student: So most of the problems we have are based on the process, not the material selection itself? If we figured out what materials weld well with other materials, and what regions need a transition material, it's the actual welding process that's messed up that causes the issues mostly?
It's the processing. Going back to my little plot before about properties — we don't have to engineer the properties of the material; we spent billions of dollars doing that. The processing, which is out there in the shop, still has shortcuts. If you don't take the shortcuts, fine. But if you start taking shortcuts — I can't teach you all the things that are in this book or all those books. It's enough for you to know that what I teach is sort of what I've seen from thousands of failure analyses over forty years of my career. I emphasize what I consider to be the most practical, as opposed to the most scientific. It's not that we don't have some decent science on hydrogen cracking, but okay.
My friend John wrote this book. It's a great book, I refer to it. I can talk about lamellar tearing, which was a problem in the 1970s when I worked at Bethlehem Steel. I've got to go to Australia this summer, and there's a crushing machine four stories tall in the Philippines that was used for mining gold. It was all cracked because the steel had lamellar tearing — when something occurs in the base plate. You ever have baklava? Three kilos, three layers, and however they put the nuts in, it falls apart. That's what lamellar tearing is, what occurs in the base. But the problem is, these cracks occurred in the base plate — had nothing to do with the welding. This guy wrote a report, 237 paragraphs, I read it.
In 108 paragraphs he mentions the word laminations. Five sets of inspectors inspected the steel, no one found any laminations, but he writes a report and he's still talking about laminations. That's sort of what's going on in a lot of these welding books. They're still talking about problems that have been solved in the past.
You're not going to come out of this being an expert in all these different things, and I don't want to confuse you telling you about all these problems we used to have that we really have solved. You solve the problem of laminations in steel by producing good-quality steel with low sulfur content and low inclusion content, and we make better steel today than we did in 1940 or 1950. Unless you get some sort of third-world steel where they're still making it like they did in the 1930s, you won't run into laminations. I'm not sure I've ever seen real laminations.
§7. Brittle fracture and fracture surfaces [38:07]
I do want to talk a little bit about steel, so we'll talk about brittle fracture. Here's a little graph I put together to explain brittle fracture. This is stress versus strain — mechanical force versus stretch. At some percent offset you'll have the yield point of the material. I have pictures of steel fractures here. This is intergranular fracture, very little fracture, no ductility. There are some steels that, if you don't process them properly, will fail in intergranular mode. We're looking at the fracture surface at high magnifications, probably 500x. These are all about 500x.
In the elastic region, basically, it's like stretching a rubber band. If you release the force, it comes right back to its original shape. Once you get above the yield point, you stretch it and it takes a permanent set — it doesn't come back to its original shape. It turns out brittle fracture occurs in the elastic range. We talked about elastic-plastic and elastic-brittle fracture. The elastic fractures are exemplified by glass. Steel can be that way. There are certain types of steel that we call high-strength steel that fail by cleavage fracture — that's three to five percent strain. That's enough stretch to avoid most catastrophic failures, but you're still getting deformation of the steel before you break. You can get some range before you ever get to the yield strength of the steel on brittle fractures. They're unpredictable in terms of strength levels; the actual fracture, you have to use fracture mechanics to explain.
Here are better pictures in the book. We have ductile failure, which is like a cup and cone. [Tom gestures.] You see the edges, the cup-and-cone fractures. Cleavage fracture looks like this. There's a little bit of strain — it's not completely brittle. And then there's completely brittle, intergranular, where you have less than one percent strain. So that's the difference in the fracture behavior.
§8. World tonnages and recycling [41:15]
I also want to say something about how much we use of particular materials. [Tom finds a chart.] We use about half a billion tons of steel in the world. The United States uses about 100 million tons of that. The world makes one and a half billion tons. Actually more now. Aluminum is only 45 million tons. You go down here, you look at some of these other elements — a hundred bucks a pound, and you're not up by that many tons.
But nonmetals — these ceramic-type materials — are actually the larger-volume materials. We use about six billion tons of stone. You just pick rock and crush it. Aggregate — you use it to fill up holes, you put it as railroad bedding for railroad tracks. We use lots of stone. Cement is currently at 2.2 billion tons.
I told you one of the advantages of steel is that it's recyclable. At one and a half billion tons, we recycle over a billion tons of steel a year. One time someone said, well, we're gonna run out of steel. Some guys bet on that about fifty years ago, and they built what they call mini-mills, and they made a fortune by using 100 percent recycled steel. Because for a hundred years we were putting about fifty million tons a year of steel into the environment, and that stuff eventually comes back as scrap.
When I started working, when I worked at Bethlehem Steel, seventy percent of the steel came from virgin iron ore, thirty percent was from scrap. Today over 50 percent is recycled. Aluminum is not quite that far along in its recycling, but the more aluminum we use, the more it's going to go into the environment, and the more it's going to come back. If we ever had a steel shortage, it will come back as twenty-dollar scrap soon.
One of the problems with cement: how do you recycle cement? Is it worth it to break it apart into stone? It takes a lot of energy. If you take my materials selection course, I talk about these things. That's where this plot came from. It talks about the cost of materials and the usage. It turns out the less the cost, the more gets used. Well, duh. But most materials scientists don't think about that.