§1. The long view: Saint-Gobain and material cost as fraction of product cost [03:12]
There's only one company I know of that is more concerned about long-term viability than about next quarter. Well, plenty of companies worry about more than next quarter, but let me give the extreme example: the French company Saint-Gobain. Saint-Gobain made glass for the Versailles palace four hundred years ago. I have a former student who's risen fairly high in Saint-Gobain. He tells me the question they ask at their top management is, if we go into this business — and they're about a thirty-billion-dollar company, they make construction materials for homes, glass and drywall and things like that — will this help us be in business a hundred years from now? They're very proud of the fact that they've lasted for four hundred years as a company.
Has anyone ever seen the statistics for the hundred largest companies in 1900 and whether they existed in 2000 in the United States? Only about five percent of the companies that were the hundred largest in the United States in 1900 existed a hundred years later. They went out of business. It's the old buggy whip story — when cars come along, people don't need buggy whips anymore.
So Saint-Gobain is a company that makes their decisions not on next quarter, not even on the next year or next five years. It's, will I be in business a hundred years from now? In the long-term economic view, if you can reach the long term, you will have a significant advantage if you can reduce your cost. In the short term, there might be a lot of pain that goes along with that.
Now, what fraction of a product's cost is the material cost? The highest one I know of is a pipeline. The steel that goes into a pipeline is about thirty percent of the cost of that project. The rest is digging the hole in the ground, insulating or putting a corrosion-resistant coating on the pipe, welding it, burying it, inspecting it, testing it — all those other things go for seventy percent of the cost. An automobile or an aircraft, it's about ten percent of the cost.
Let's say I've got an automobile that costs $25,000. Does that mean there's $2,500 worth of materials in that automobile? No. Anybody know about how much the material costs in an automobile are? It actually is about five percent, because about forty percent of that automobile cost is health insurance.
The CEOs of a lot of the big automobile companies and other companies have gotten very interested in health costs. Anybody live in Simmons Hall? Do you know who Dick Simmons is — was, actually still is? Dick Simmons was a graduate of this department around 1952 or '53, got a bachelor's degree, went to work for a steel company, ended up owning the steel company and making about half a billion dollars for Allegheny Ludlum Steel in two leveraged buyouts in the 1980s. When the American steel industry was losing money regularly in the 1980s, Allegheny Ludlum never had an unprofitable quarter. Dick Simmons, being an MIT student, didn't have to take economics or go to business school to learn to play with numbers — he could do them in his head. But he also understood the industry he was in and he knew when to invest and what to invest in, because he knew how to make steel.
During the '90s, his son-in-law made another half billion for him in venture capital. He gave $20 million to build Simmons Hall. Dick Simmons put himself on the board of a major hospital in Pittsburgh, because he saw his health insurance costs for his employees go through the roof, and he wanted to understand where hospitals were spending the money so he could try to lower health costs and save money in the steel company.
So health costs are getting to be a substantial fraction. But the basic steel structure of a Ford Taurus, a $25,000 car — if you calculate the cost of the steel, it's about $500. Now there's other things go into a car, aside from the engine, which is the most expensive part of the car. What's the number two most expensive thing? The seats. People like seats, they like them to be comfortable.
But automobile and aircraft, in general about ten percent of the cost is material cost. Ten or twenty percent is for inspection, ten or twenty percent is for machining or shaping or forming, ten for welding and joining, and you put all these things together and you end up with only about ten percent of the cost being the material. When you get to semiconductors and spacecraft, there's lots of inspection, there's lots of value added. For a printed circuit board, it may only be one percent for the cost of the raw material. The cost of silicon is not very much compared to the cost of that chip with all the functionality and layers on it.
§2. The value of a pound saved [09:44]
Before I put it all together — people are always trying to save weight on automobiles. Anybody have an idea of what the value of a pound saved in an automobile is over a hundred-thousand-mile life? How much money do you save if you take a pound of weight out of a 3,500-pound car?
It's two dollars a pound for an automobile, over the life of a vehicle. I wrote this about twenty years ago — maybe today it's three dollars a pound, oil has gone up — but it's about two dollars a pound, if you figure out how much gasoline you're going to save over the life of a vehicle over a hundred thousand miles.
For a commercial aircraft, it's about two hundred dollars a pound. At one of the major airlines — I can't remember if it's US Air or Delta — a vice president has to sign off on everything that goes into the aircraft, like the coffee pots. They used to have magazines on international flights, I think they still do, but they have to sign off on that, because you're going to be paying two hundred dollars a pound to carry that magazine around. That coffee pot needs to be lightweight because of the fuel cost.
The average life of a commercial aircraft — the airframe is usually about a hundred thousand hours, at least the number I have for 747s. The engines go for thirty thousand, and if you completely overhaul it once, sixty thousand.
For a space shuttle, the value of a pound saved — now what's the pound we're saving here? We're talking about payload in space. So I'm changing the basis. The first one is gasoline over a hundred thousand miles, the second is jet fuel over a hundred thousand hours or sixty thousand hours, but order of magnitude is two hundred dollars a pound. For a spacecraft, we're talking about payload in orbit.
If you wanted to fly out of the Soviet Cosmodrome and take a flight in space, how much do those guys pay right now for a flight in space to be a cosmonaut? Twenty million, right. That's actually more than twenty thousand dollars a pound for most people. It cost a lot to put something up in space. When they built the space shuttle — if you go back and look at the old documents in 1972, the space shuttle was supposed to replace rockets, which were costing about ten to fifteen thousand dollars a pound back in the sixties to put a payload into orbit. Some of these early satellites weighed a hundred pounds or more, so you're talking a lot of money. Even today a typical communication satellite launch might be insured for $100 million, just to put that one satellite in orbit. That's just the launching cost.
The space shuttle was supposed to reduce the cost to a thousand dollars a pound in orbit. Anybody have an idea how close they got to that? With the Challenger disaster, they shut down everything, and when you divide by zero flights a year your fixed costs are still there and you get a very big number. But if you start looking at all the shuttle flights, they might have hit a hundred thousand. They shut down the space shuttle because the five or six or seven ships were growing old, and that's true, but it was never economical. The whole space shuttle program was justified through NASA, but it was really justified for Defense Department needs.
§3. The X-33 space plane and the 10-day shelf-life bullet point [14:37]
About ten or fifteen years ago, they wanted to build a replacement for the space shuttle, and they called it the X-33 space plane. This was also supposed to get the cost to orbit down. The thing about the space shuttle, if you remember — it's got the shuttle that returns to earth, plus the main tank and the rocket boosters. They recover the shells of the rocket boosters, but the main tank just goes to the bottom of the ocean. So the bulk of the structure is a throwaway.
The X-33 space plane was supposed to be single-stage to orbit rather than dual-stage. It was going to run on the lightest fuel possible, which is hydrogen. So it was going to run on H2 and O2. There was one oxygen tank and two hydrogen tanks. In order to save weight even further, so you could make it single-stage to orbit and return the whole spacecraft to earth, they were going to make the tanks the structure. The outer skin was really just a skin for aerodynamics, it wasn't structural.
NASA had a program to build a half-size space shuttle, the X-33 space plane. It was going to go from the Lockheed Martin Skunk Works in Palmdale, California, and fly to Dugway Proving Ground in Utah. It was going to get up to about 120 miles and land. This was right after the first Gulf War, and the Defense Department was very interested in something called rapid prototyping. So they gave this contract to Lockheed Martin and said, we want you to build this in thirty-three months from release of contract to first flight. Thirty-three months is pretty fast to build a half-size spacecraft.
They spent the first six or seven months developing the tanks. The tanks were supposed to be the structure, and between the tanks you had these connecting structures. The main structure that held everything together was the tanks; everything else was an appendage. Of course the engines had to have something to carry the thrust back.
They were looking at ring-stiffened cylinders — sort of like a submarine, a big tube with internal beams — and they were going to do 3D woven composites. They were moving along and they thought, this is wonderful. Then they went out for bids and they found that they would spend nearly the whole $1.3 billion budget for a 3D woven composite of graphite fibers. How do you make a 3D woven composite? You take layers of 2D, wind them up, and then you have someone with a needle and thread the third dimension with graphite fibers. That gets pricey.
So that won't work. Their time budget for the thirty-three months was such that they only had about two months left. They said, we've got to do something else. You can buy Nomex hexel foam — Nomex is sort of like Kevlar. And you could put reinforced graphite fibers in epoxy, coated graphite fibers, and make a very light, very rigid structure, only about an inch and a half thick. You could have titanium and other parts as the feed-throughs for the ports. And you can make liquid hydrogen tanks. The oxygen tank was going to be aluminum, but they did make two hydrogen tanks, at the cost of $50 million apiece.
They built them in the same hangar where the stealth fighter was built, in Palmdale, California. I got to go there. They built these two hydrogen tanks. They had to put them in an autoclave big enough — these are both about the size of a small two-story house — to bond everything together. They were using sheets of structural adhesive to take the Nomex film they could buy off the shelf and the graphite and glue it together.
They looked on the website, and the supplier of this structural adhesive said it had a ten-day shelf life. The structural adhesive is an epoxy. They produce it and keep it in a refrigerator until you're ready to bond it. You have ten days, according to the bullet on the website that said it has a ten-day shelf life. Once you take it out of the refrigerator and it warms up to room temperature, if you don't put it in the autoclave and heat it up and get that epoxy to flow within ten days, you're not going to get a good bond, because the epoxy starts its chemical reaction at room temperature. That's why you store it in the refrigerator.
In most cases they got it into the autoclave within three or four days. One of them took seven days. They bonded it, and when they came out and pressure-tested it, one of them failed, formed a big blister. What's going on here? They found out that the bullet point that said it had a ten-day shelf life — you've got to be careful about bullet points. When they actually looked at the data behind it, the strength of the adhesive looked like this: at one day it was 100 percent strength, and at ten days it was about ten or twenty percent strength. So they were out at seven days in some cases. The bullet point said ten-day shelf life, but it didn't tell you you only have twenty percent strength at ten days. 100 percent strength was at one day. That's the problem of not having all the data.
They built these two $50 million structures. The whole thing only weighed — these tanks weighed four thousand pounds each. Divide that into fifty million, that's twelve thousand five hundred dollars a pound fabricated. [Tom holds up a piece of the X-33 tank composite.] I don't know what that's worth. It's a piece of government property, I shouldn't have it, but I got it.
If you want a whole tank, one of them didn't blow up, one of them is still sitting in Palmdale, you might be able to buy it at a discount if you need something for a chicken coop. They put it in tests in Huntsville, Alabama, one of the only places where you can test with five or ten thousand gallons of liquid hydrogen. Not very many places have that — you can't go down to the store and get it. And Huntsville is removed from everywhere, in case there's an explosion.
They thought they had passed the test. They pressurized it, did their prototype check, and everything was fine until it started to warm up. The whole thing was covered in frost, and they had it on video — a bunch of frost blew off. The thing had leaked. There's a difference in coefficient of thermal expansion between the graphite-epoxy and the Nomex and the adhesive joint, if it's not very strong anyway. They had a $50 million piece of junk, and they ended up eventually cancelling the $1.3 billion program.
Now other people have come in and are trying to figure out how to commercialize getting into space, because NASA didn't do so well in their X-33 program and a few other programs. We're talking about selection of materials. People can talk about all these wonderful fancy materials, but they often don't talk about the price. They will talk about how wonderful the properties are.
§4. Sprague's law, Williams's corollary, and the availability problem [24:39]
There was a guy at General Electric Aircraft Engines named Bob Sprague. He was manager of materials, one level beneath the vice president. His first law is: when you hear something about a new material, write it down, because it may be the best thing you'll ever hear about that material. New materials are wonderful when you first hear about them. As time goes on, well, it won't do X, it won't do Y, it won't do A through J, but otherwise it's very good — maybe in this one property.
Jim Williams, who's a titanium expert, became a dean at Ohio State, and then went and replaced Bob Sprague at General Electric Aircraft Engines in Cincinnati, had a corollary: when you hear the price of a new material, write it down because it's the lowest price you'll ever hear. This actually is Jim Williams's slide. We were giving a talk together at a conference. I put up my two-, two-hundred-, twenty-thousand-dollars-a-pound slide, and Jim put up his in the next talk, and afterwards we talked, and he gave me his slide because I didn't know his corollary. Things always get more expensive — the performance properties always drop and the price gets higher with time. At least that's the trend.
Jim used to call them boutique materials — materials that are not used in very large volume. People would come to him with fantastic new materials for an engine, but they couldn't buy it because there was no one to manufacture it. So availability is a significant problem.
I told you about the rare earth magnets. Did I tell you about neodymium boron? It was invented at the General Motors research lab. This is for small motors and things like that. When you're talking about the automotive business, General Motors wanted to use these to reduce the size of motors and starters in engines. But they looked at the abundance of neodymium in the world before they came up with this alloy. No one had ever used neodymium metal. It might have been something that someone bought ten grams of in a research laboratory, but that doesn't really make a market.
There's a story out of Louisiana that some laboratory had invented a wonderful new polymer, and a chemical company decided they wanted to get some of it. They went to a company and said, we'd like to buy some of this polymer that we'd read a paper about. The company had never heard of this polymer. They researched it and found out it was made by this professor in Louisiana, who'd published the paper on it. They called him up and said, I'd like to buy ten grams of this material. He says, I can probably arrange that, I'll get a graduate student to work on it. The graduate student looks at how this material was made and thinks, this is pretty difficult. So they decided to look and see if it was commercially available. They found this company that listed they would provide it. She called them and said, I'd like to buy ten grams. The company said, sure, we have a source for that. So they upped their order to the professor for twenty grams — this is a business beginning to grow, if you can see this Ponzi scheme going. The graduate student was now going to have to make twenty grams, so she was going to have to order twenty grams.
Availability is sometimes a problem for new materials. General Motors had to threaten to buy neodymium mines in Brazil and go into the neodymium business to make their own magnets, because there was no one who had a source. When some people heard about this, they decided this is a good business — General Motors wants to buy tons of neodymium. It turns out General Motors never had to go into the business. It wasn't new technology to make neodymium metal; there just never had been a market for it before the magnets came along. So availability is often a problem.
There's another story about bringing plastics to market. Plastics were not a very popular material until after World War II. People knew how to make polyethylene back in the 1930s. I had a student do a doctoral thesis on the growth of the plastics industry. One of the big chemical companies decided they were going to build a polyethylene plant, even though there were no applications at the time for polyethylene. Polyethylene is not a fancy material — it's a plastic you don't want to make chairs out of. You usually make chairs out of polypropylene because it's stronger, more rigid, higher modulus. But polyethylene people could make, and they decided to build this 50-million-pound-a-year facility, and they hoped that if you build it they will come.
They built it, and they had all kinds of startup problems and quality problems, and they had hundreds of thousands of pounds of variable-quality material. They couldn't convince anybody to use it in a high-value application. This was in the mid-fifties. Then someone came along with a perfect application. Anybody know what it was? Nope, that's polyester. It was hula hoops. In the mid-fifties hula hoops were the craze, and they could take all this junk product they'd made, variable quality — all they had to do was extrude it into a tube, turn it into a circle, join it together, and sell it and make a profit. I, as a five-year-old, was using hula hoops. They got rid of all their excess inventory of low-quality material, and that allowed them to go down the processing learning curve to make high-quality polyethylene. When they could make higher-quality polyethylene, they could start selling it for inside liners of refrigerators. A traditional corrosion problem — refrigerators had been made out of painted steel, and if you chip the paint you start corroding through the inside panel. Now we use polyethylene and other plastics for refrigerator doors. That was how polyethylene got going — it was almost a big bust until someone came up with the idea for hula hoops.
§5. Ashby's selection map: spacecraft, aircraft, automobile [32:39]
If I get back to my two dollars, two hundred dollars, twenty thousand dollars a pound orders of magnitude — and combine it with the slide before, that the cost of material is only ten percent of the final product cost — you get to the point that if you look at Ashby's book, the earlier edition on selection of materials, the only materials you can choose to build spacecraft at twenty thousand dollars a pound are things like diamond and boron-epoxy composites and cobalt alloys. The only things you really want to build aircraft out of are hardwoods, polypropylene, aluminum sheet, stainless steels, polymethyl methacrylate — that's basically cheap plastic — nickel and titanium alloys.
Here's spacecraft, here's aircraft, and down here, this is what you can make an automobile out of: polyethylene, silicon carbide — cheap silicon carbide, not the really good stuff — plywood, low-alloy steel, mild steel, cast iron, concrete, coal, and cement. It was knowing this type of information that I used to predict that we wouldn't all be riding around in aluminum automobiles twenty years later. And we're not. People make aluminum automobiles, but they're not making them for $25,000 vehicles, they're making them for $100,000 automobiles like Audis. Anybody can do that — it's not new technology.
So the value of the material in its application is going to determine what the allowable materials are. You hear all this press about high-tech materials, or what Jim Williams would call boutique materials. Jim Williams was in the titanium industry before he went to General Electric. He was a pure academic and he used to go around selling this schlock. Then when he went to industry he realized you have this price function. If you can't sell it at a profit, the managers aren't going to let you use it.
A new material for automobiles today is still aluminum sheet. I got this out of Ford research — this is an ultrasonic weld on aluminum sheet, where Ford is trying to figure out how to join it inexpensively. We had all-aluminum Corvettes before we had fiberglass — maybe we had fiberglass first, but we've been building expensive vehicles for a long time. For inexpensive vehicles, aluminum is still a new material. You can use it for deck lids and things like that. The F-150 and the Silverado pickup trucks have an aluminum hood. Just be careful, it dents more easily, it doesn't have as good a modulus as steel.
§6. The blisk and friction welding [36:15]
Another thing on the value of materials: that $200 or $2 a pound is a general number, but if a product moves, the faster it moves, the more important the cost savings. The example I usually give is unsprung weight on a car. It's more important to take a pound off the weight of the wheel or the brakes, where you've got the unsprung weight, versus the sprung weight. The sprung weight isn't moving as fast, but if that wheel's bouncing up and down, there's lots of energy and wear and tear, and if you can take weight out of it, you're a lot better off.
One of the best examples I have is when I talk about welding, and friction welding, I talk about the blisk. A blisk is a bladed disc. They've built about thirty or forty thousand Rolls-Royce M250 engines that go in helicopters and small aircraft like Cessnas. It's a small turbofan engine, and it has a cast blisk about this big. It's a single blisk of nickel-based superalloy, and the blades are cast directly onto the disc. You don't have all the weight that you have in a typical turbine blade in a bigger engine, where you have to join the blade — which is a simple little airfoil — to the disc. Blades and vanes are airfoils generally; blades rotate and stators don't.
On the rotating part, you have this big Christmas-tree structure. Sixty or seventy percent of the weight is the structure to join it together mechanically. The machining on this is really critical. You could get rid of all this structure if you could just weld the blade directly to the disc. The Air Force did a study. In terms of the Air Force, the value of a pound saved is not two hundred dollars a pound in an aircraft — it turns out to be about a thousand dollars a pound in a military aircraft over the life of the vehicle. Some of these things are so high-performance, you may only have a payload capacity of five or ten thousand pounds, and that can either go for increased distance — you can carry fuel tanks — or you can carry ordnance. What you're talking about is not just how many miles you're going to go, but how much ordnance you can carry to where you want it.
For spacecraft, they're trying to move toward friction welding — friction welding of things like aluminum and titanium. Friction welding of aluminum is what friction welding was invented for. The space shuttle main tank, they were looking at friction welding that — the big tank that goes into the ocean afterwards. Since they're not making that anymore, NASA has now got a big program at Michoud, in Mississippi or Louisiana, where they used to build the space shuttle, for friction welding of aluminum structures. And Boeing had a big program for friction welding because you don't get the distortion you get when you arc-weld aluminum, and it should be a better structure.
There was a firm that was going to build a private jet, all friction-welded titanium. They went belly up, but they had a lot of Wall Street Journal press about how they were going to be lighter because they wouldn't have these big heavy joints. Mechanical joints add weight. If you can make a good weld, it's going to be lighter weight in general. Friction welding is a problem for anything above aluminum because you've got to have a mandrel that doesn't get consumed by the heat. You can do it with titanium, but titanium is pretty reactive and you get a lot of wear and tear on your mandrel, whereas aluminum works great.
If you can afford the tooling — Boeing built a $10 million tool to do friction welding of parts of aircraft wings, and it just makes one part. That's a lot of investment, but when you're talking $200 a pound saved, and you're making as many aircraft as Boeing is going to make, you can justify it at $200 a pound. But don't expect to see friction welding in automobiles at $2 a pound when you start looking at the capital cost of the equipment.
So again — these are not necessarily externalities, but there are functions on the price and cost, which is the tooling that goes into making all this. Because that tooling and inspection and fabrication is ninety percent of the cost, the material is only ten percent. All of us in Course Three think materials are wonderful — they're only wonderful for ten percent of the world. Mechanical engineers got a much bigger slice of the pie in terms of making things.
The Air Force had a big program to do friction welding of blades to discs, great big ones, and it never worked out. You can take my welding course and I'll tell you more about it. The idea was you could save twenty pounds off every disc, and that could be two hundred pounds on an engine. If you could save two hundred pounds on the engine — you have multiple engines on many of these aircraft, at least if it's Navy rather than Air Force. The Air Force doesn't mind having only one engine and losing aircraft; the Navy likes to have an extra engine.
If you take 200 or 400 pounds off the engine, you can take up to 2,000 pounds off the airframe, because those wings have to hold the engines, and if the engines are lighter, the whole structure can be lighter.
§7. Diesel as the next efficiency revolution [43:30]
I just read — I think it was in the Economist this week — that the next technology to replace hybrids in automobiles for higher fuel efficiency is taking place in Europe. The Economist is not the best science magazine I've ever read — their economic predictions aren't bad, but their technology predictions are not necessarily so great. I think their science editor stinks. But they have vehicles in Europe that'll get 60 miles a gallon using diesel engines.
Everybody in the United States thinks diesel is dirty. It was probably the Germans who started thinking differently about diesels. Instead of going to higher and higher compression ratios — because that's where everybody says, that's why the diesel is thirty or forty percent more thermodynamically efficient than the Otto cycle engine. Anybody know what the Otto cycle engine is? It's what we call a gasoline engine. If you study thermodynamics, it's the Otto cycle as opposed to the diesel cycle. The diesel is thirty percent more efficient than the Otto cycle, which means our gasoline engines are like thirty percent heat efficient, and you get thirty percent on top of that, so forty percent. Still a lot less than fifty percent, but a one-third increase in efficiency in the automotive business is pretty significant.
Jet engines are called the Brighton [Brayton] cycle, if you want to study thermo someday. These are all just how the PV curve goes through the cycle. There's the Carnot cycle — many of you have heard of it, but I don't know any engine that uses a Carnot cycle. That was the first cycle that someone drew on a little PV diagram back two hundred years ago. I guess it was probably Sati Corona Carno [Sadi Carnot] who drew it.
Instead of going to higher compression ratios — diesel engines are hard to start for various reasons, but one is they have a high compression ratio. They went to a lower compression ratio. Instead of 16 or 17 to 1, they went to 14 to 1. When they did that, they no longer had to have a cast iron engine block for the strength they needed at higher pressure. At lower pressures, they could make aluminum engine blocks. So they got thirty percent more efficiency over the Otto cycle gasoline engine, plus twenty-five percent lighter weight. And when they got twenty-five percent lighter weight in the engine, they could downsize the brakes and everything else in the structure. So they're getting 60 miles a gallon in diesel engines in Europe right now, and some people are predicting this will start challenging hybrids in the automobile business.
Diesel used to be a dollar less a gallon if I went back fifteen, twenty years. If I'm running a refinery, I'm going to have to produce some diesel and some gasoline. That ratio can be varied depending on how I operate my refinery, my cracker, what catalyst I use, temperatures and pressures. Diesel fuel is not all that different than heating oil. You could use diesel fuel if you want to pay that price.
A few years ago — and I can't remember what drove the increased use of diesel fuel, but it did — diesel used to be the cheaper fuel, close to a dollar cheaper than gasoline, or at least seventy-five cents cheaper. About ten years ago, all of a sudden diesel fuel and home heating oil prices went up, and now diesel is more expensive. Why? I don't know. They started increasing taxes on people. It could be because of all the politics — the populist is using gasoline and they don't see that, and they don't know that it's affecting their heating oil prices.
And those people from Massachusetts — they didn't vote Democrat, they didn't vote Republican. Remember in '72 Massachusetts was the only state that went for McGovern, and the bumper stickers, "Don't blame me, I'm from Massachusetts," after Richard Nixon. You're all too young to remember that, but I was around.
Anyway — if you save a little bit of weight in one place, you might save it a bunch of other places. That was kind of my story. According to the Economist, diesel can — I'm going to give you some examples in a little bit. Actually I'm not going to give you much more today because it's time to finish.
§8. The unplowed field: a life lesson [48:48]
Thinking the opposite of where everyone else is is a very valuable thing to do. I can show it to you in the steel industry, I can show you some other things. I often describe it as what I learned in second grade doing an Easter egg hunt. I actually sort of made a career out of this, of not trying to plow the same field everyone else is plowing.
I was at this Easter egg hunt, and just like a second grade soccer game today, this one kid said, oh I found one, and everybody goes running over there. I was at the far end of the yard, and I turned just like everyone else, and all I could see were a bunch of backs. I thought, they're all going to see those Easter eggs over there before I will. I actually remember this. I decided to go to the other end of the yard where no children were and look for Easter eggs there, because I wouldn't have the competition.
It was a life lesson. I don't know if you ever read the book Everything I Need to Know I Learned in Kindergarten. I was a little late, I was in second grade, but I learned that you don't try to do what everyone else is doing. First of all, over time they're usually wrong. But even if they're not, there's plenty of good diamonds in the soil in the unplowed field. If you go plowing through a field that a thousand other people have already plowed, you're not going to find what you want to find. Go look in the field where no one has plowed.
Part of that was part of my MIT upgrade. I was really humbled when I came to MIT to find out I was in the bottom third of my entering class. And then as I went along and talked to people, I found I was dumber than that, compared to all the rest of these people. If you have the humility to realize that if you go into the latest and greatest field, you're competing with a lot of really smart people, and if you have the humility to realize that you're not necessarily equal with all of them, then you go and do what I did.
I went into welding for my tenure because a great materials science guy named John Kahn [Cahn], when I was first starting — he denies this now — but he said, get into a backward field, it's not hard to be a star. He didn't want everybody to hear that because he was sort of a physicist working in materials science, and he was afraid the materials scientists would think less of him if he said materials science was a backward field. I realized I didn't have the ability that a lot of other people had, so I went into a backward field. And I couldn't find a more backward field than welding. So that's why I was in welding. That's life's lesson today. I'll see you tomorrow, 8:30.