§1. Course mechanics and structure [00:03]
Forget the registrar's schedule. We will meet every day that Dr. Belmar or I are present. There will be 24 live lectures, and then sometime around the beginning of November, you'll all get to do a presentation, and I'll talk about that more. That's the only requirement other than coming to class and looking at the handouts.
The course has evolved over the years. A few years ago, Professor Shu, when he was chairman of the graduate committee, asked me to expand it beyond what I'd been doing for years, which was a welding course. I got my tenure in welding and joining, and then I switched it over to a manufacturing course, and I taught some selection of materials and some other things. They asked me to broaden it, particularly because there are not many faculty left that deal with metals and structural materials. About 25 years ago I started teaching with a video. We did this because General Motors wanted to take my welding course as part of the master's program they ran for their students.
I learned after about a year that videotaping the lecture is not a bad thing, because if you miss class you can watch the movie. I could lecture more topics, and the students could watch them at other times. I used to have students in the LGO program go off to their seven-month internship and take my course, and some of them would say they would watch the lectures while they were fixing dinner.
I was an MIT undergraduate — I came here 45 years ago — and this is my 38th year on the faculty. About 25 years ago I came to the conclusion that the way we teach at MIT is all wrong. You're all very smart, and you've all gotten here because you know how to take quizzes. The students, particularly undergraduates more than graduate students, are worried about their grades and worried about the quiz, and they focus on that, and they're not focusing on just trying to learn.
So thirty years ago when I started teaching the welding course I decided this is silly. No one has to take my welding course; we'll just do it and we'll enjoy doing it and learn. When I was a student I hated problem sets, I hated three-hour finals, and I remember how much I hated those things. I won't make you endure those. I do have to have something to grade you. The Institute says I must grade you each individually, not as a group, so you have to do something. More recently what I've been asking students to do is a presentation on whatever interests you.
Hopefully you can fit it into somewhere — this course is supposed to be about structural materials and material selection. Maybe you're interested in bicycles, and I've had students do materials of construction of bicycles. There are lots of different things you can make a bicycle out of, from a hundred-dollar bicycle to a ten-thousand-dollar bicycle. I've had people do doorknobs — one person was interested in decorative doorknobs through the ages. You'll do about a twelve-minute presentation. We'll do three a day, and with ten of you we'll finish that up in a week. If all goes well you'll be finished well before Thanksgiving with this course.
We do have a need for someone to videotape. Steve is doing it today, but he has classes Mondays, Wednesdays, and Fridays at nine. So who would like to earn a thousand dollars and come to class? The two of you get together with Steve and you can share it — I'd love to have two people sharing it. I might give you a little bit more than a thousand to do that. There's also loading it onto the website. Steve can show you how to do it. The reason I like to have two people is if one person gets sick the other can fill in. It works out to about $50 an hour, so it's a fair price.
§2. MIT philosophy and teaching style [05:34]
I wrote an article in 2004 in the MIT Faculty Newsletter about leadership, management, and education at MIT. What I think makes an MIT education different than most other schools — there are only two schools I know of that admit only one class of students, and those are Caltech and MIT. What class of students do we admit? Scholars. If you go to Harvard, they admit three classes of students. Anybody know what three classes they are? Scholars — give you a hint. What's another one? Athletes. The third is they call legacy students. That means sons and daughters of wealthy alumni.
Princeton and Stanford and Harvard freely admit they admit three classes of students. This is not a secret. They admit athletes who ordinarily wouldn't be qualified as scholars, and legacy students who were too dumb to go anywhere else, but their parents or grandparents gave millions of dollars. Princeton, Yale, Stanford — they all admit three classes of students. MIT and Caltech, so far as I know, admit only one class of students, and that's scholars. That allows us to do a freshman year that is completely filled — no electives — and everybody starts out with calculus, physics, chemistry, biology, and humanities. No choice — in a wonderful system. It allows us to homogenize academically your background in that first year, and then you accelerate in succeeding years. So the freshman year is not wasted on all this other stuff. It increases the pace and pressure of MIT.
There are five things in the article that I think make MIT unique. You have to take three modules, but only two of them are going to be live this term. I'll be lecturing on material selection at a high level, non-destructive evaluation, and if we have time I'm supposed to do some welding metallurgy. There are some people in Course 2N, the Navy program, that I teach during the summer, and if you take some of these other modules you may see those on tape during the summer; I tend to give lots of naval examples to those Navy students.
Dr. Belmar will be talking about material selection and structural and environmental effects on materials. My material selection is a much broader overview than his; specifically, what types of materials do you choose for structural materials. He will also talk about casting, foraging [forging], forming — which I call deformation processing — joining, which I have two modules on, and coatings and surface treatments, which I don't really cover but he's going to spend one lecture each on. He's going to spend eight lectures on environmental and mechanical behavior, which is how do you design with structural materials.
I'm going to do a broader view of some things, he's going to do a broader view of other things, and others will get more specific. You don't have to take his live or mine live. In fact you don't have to take any of them live. The video modules online are: solid state — I've been teaching a version of these first two for about 30 years now — welding, soldering, brazing, cold welding, diffusion bonding, adhesive bonding, fusion welding (flames, arcs, lasers, electron beams). I've done one set on casting, another on deformation processing — forging, rolling, drawing. I've done a couple on codes and standards, and Dr. Belmar has done structural life assessment and selection and processing of structural materials.
We will give you the schedule as we know it, which is not usually more than about a week and a half ahead. You come to class every day if you want to take both modules that are live. I'll lecture two days, he'll lecture two days, I'll do two days, and he'll do two days of the first eight days. So by the end of next week you're one-third done with two of your modules. You have to pick one of the other modules. Anybody taking this course for a particular reason? Student: Nickel-based superalloys. Okay, so if I remember that, then I'll try to weave in some nickel-based superalloys.
Anybody else? No one is going to go work for Boeing, or build houses for a living? I had one student years ago whose father ran a boatyard just south of Boston — that's what he's been doing for the last 30 years. He got his bachelor's degree, straight-A student at MIT, went off, and he's been building fancy boats for rich people. You'll have to pick one of these others, and watch those by video at your own time. The website needs to be cleaned up in the next week — if you go look at it right now you won't see things quite this coherent on the introductory page.
§3. Teaching philosophy — stories, arcs, and not doing derivations [13:34]
Over the years my lectures are sort of Tom Eagar and stories. I have a fair amount of experience and a lot of different problems that the world has faced. That's why it'd be hard to grade you on these things. Hopefully you'll learn something. I've had students come back two or three years after they graduated and tell me they got more out of my course that's useful than any other course they had at MIT. I don't remember how to integrate sine x over x — I took that, but I don't do that type of thing every day. I learned differential equations, I passed it — in fact I thought they were simply cookbook algebra. But that's not what I do every day as an engineer.
I would rather talk to you about real engineering problems and all the complexities of them. I also have a difference in philosophy from a lot of faculty, and this is not just MIT, it's everywhere. Many faculty want to impress you with how much they know, and they're going to impart this to you if you pay a big tuition. I would much rather try to convince you that you already know most of what you need to know — you just need to learn to organize your thoughts.
In one of the arc lectures in fusion welding I talk about arc physics. There are arcs in this room — I'm looking up at them, fluorescent lights are arcs. They're a little bit different from a welding arc, but in fact they have the same physics of an electric arc. It's a two-temperature plasma as opposed to a welding plasma which is one-temperature, and that all has to do with the pressure of the arc. The physicists call a welding arc a high-pressure arc — anything above half an atmosphere is a high-pressure arc. A fluorescent light is significantly less, even less than a tenth of an atmosphere. If you ever break a fluorescent light it goes pop — it implodes, doesn't explode, because there's a vacuum inside the glass. Because of that you have a long mean free path between the molecules.
The electrons have a temperature in the fluorescent light of about a hundred thousand degrees, but the ions have a temperature of about 200 degrees. It's a two-temperature plasma because the electrons get accelerated in this partial vacuum. In a welding arc it's all local thermodynamic equilibrium — the ions and the electrons all have the same temperatures. Don't go putting your finger in a welding arc, you'll get burned. But you can hold onto a fluorescent light and you won't, because the ions carry the heat and the electrons don't have any heat capacity. These are the types of things — you learned about heat capacity but no one ever taught you how to use those ideas.
Hopefully my little aside didn't confuse too many of you about the difference between a fluorescent light arc and a welding arc and why one of them's hot and one of them's cold. Both give off light, because the electrons are the things that give off the light. If you start thinking about LEDs — those electrons have lots of electron volts, and so they radiate and give off light, even though an LED is even cooler than a fluorescent light and uses less energy. It all fits together, and I didn't tell you anything you didn't already know, but no one ever taught you how to put it together. They taught you how to take a quiz. Well, bull on that. You don't have to take a quiz, you can just sit here and try to figure out what I'm talking about.
That's another problem with the way I teach: I would much rather talk about some question you have and see if I can put it together. That makes the challenge for me — I've been lecturing this stuff for 25 years, I've heard it before. Just coming in and lecturing about what I've talked about 10 times before is not as interesting to me. I'll have some things, and I have lots of touchy-feelies and try to put things together and tell you a story, but I'd rather have you ask questions and stop me. Some people say he's disorganized in his lecture. I'm not completely disorganized, but the reason I use an Elmo — I'm not going to put it on a computer — is that I don't know what my next slide is going to be depending on your question or what I'm thinking of. I do have an outline, I just don't follow it.
Don't worry about grades. I've been doing this for 25 years; I've only given two grades — top and bottom. If you don't come to class, the registrar makes me give that person an F. If you're a senior I would not choose this as your pass-fail course. The philosophy is, let's try to learn, and don't toil. Most of MIT education is how to make you toil and learn to work hard, and that's a great experience. If you read my faculty newsletter, that's one of the things that makes MIT great — you learn to work hard. But at this point let's just take a breather and try to learn rather than just work hard.
I will also tell you some great secrets of MIT. Has anyone ever been to a class where the professor spent the whole time doing a proof, a derivation? Seeing some nods. Have you ever thought about why the professor did that? Student: [proposes a reason]. That's a good idea. It's not the reason, but it's a good idea, and they would tell you that's why they're teaching that way. I'll tell you a secret. My first year on the faculty I had a trip, and I came back the next morning, and I had to lecture on defamation [deformation] processing, and I hadn't prepared the lecture. I only had about an hour and a half to figure out what I was going to talk about that day. I looked in the book — it was Professor Backofen's book — and there was a derivation. I thought, great, I'll just go in and fill the time with the derivation. All of a sudden the light went off, and I thought, oh, that's why professors do derivations — they didn't have time to prepare a lecture.
I went in and I did the derivation. I went back to my office and I swore to myself I would never do another derivation in class. I used to teach thermo without doing derivations. What would I do if the derivation was in the book? I assume that MIT students are smart enough to follow the algebra in the book. I would write it out, copy it, give the students a copy. I'd say, here's the copy, let's talk about what it means and how you use the result. You can learn the algebra on your own. You don't need some PhD professor up here charging you — what's tuition now, $28,000 or something? When I started, it was $1,900, and the students were really upset. You don't need someone walking you through the algebra. That is a total waste of time. You fall asleep, I fall asleep, the professor always makes a mistake. What's the point?
There are other things that professors do that, if you actually stop and ask why they do this, it's because they procrastinate, and they want you to procrastinate. One time when I was a sophomore I had a term paper due in humanities class. So Columbus Day holiday, I spent that Monday in the basement of Walker looking through all these books doing all my research. Two or three weeks later I had it all typed up. I gave it to the professor in October, before mid-December. He gave it back to me. He says, "I don't read drafts." I gave it back to him, said, "It's not a draft." He gives it back to me, he says, "It can't be, it's not the end of the term." I said, "It is the final copy, and I know it's not the end of the term — I get things done early." He couldn't fathom it. He was used to doing everything in his life at the last minute.
So why do I want you to be done with this course in early November? You'll have three courses from November on. The professors are all trying to cram it. Why do we have rules that you can't give all this stuff — three-hour final at the end of the term — because the professors are all used to procrastinating and they're trying to cram it down your throat in the last two weeks. These are some of the reasons why I don't believe in the educational philosophy.
§4. Externalities: pollution and Oil City [24:24]
Let's start talking about other things. This came out of the Christian Science Monitor back in the 1980s. "The Graduate School of Business — I know you all want to make money, but today we're going to discuss making things. Actual things." "Things? I don't want to make things, I want to make money. Let's sue the business school, we can make some money that way." That's the philosophy of a lot of people.
In material selection, if I'm a materials engineer and I want to select some material, I am no longer capable of just doing engineering the way people used to do it, even 50 years ago. I have to worry about what the economists call externalities. Does anybody take an economics course and never learn what an externality is? Student: [defines externality]. Right, so there are social implications to what we do and how we do it.
Professor Sadoway has built up a great big research program on batteries for energy storage. He used to tell me 15 years ago, "Chemical metallurgy — we polluted the environment, now we're going to clean it up." To a certain extent he was absolutely right. Who else deals with a billion tons of material? If you've got to clean up a billion tons of material, you ought to figure out how to do it as part of your original process.
The example I like to give of the externality of pollution — the rules have changed over the years. I had an explosion in an oil refinery in Oil City, Pennsylvania. Anybody ever been to Oil City? It's up in the northwest corner. It's just down the river from Titusville. Anybody know what Titusville is famous for? It's where Edwin Drake discovered oil in 1856. That was the beginning of the drilling for oil. Otherwise they used to find oil bubbling up out of the ground. Anybody know where? It did occur in Texas. I used to always wonder why the Strategic Naval Petroleum Reserve, even back in 1900, was in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska. Who was drilling for oil in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska in 1900? Nobody. It was just bubbling up out of the ground. Someone knew there must be something underneath the ground if it's just bubbling up. A lot of the year it didn't bubble up in Prudhoe Bay, but they knew that there was oil on the ground.
The whole tar sands of Alaska — how did that get there? Bubbled up out of the ground, and all the volatiles went away, and now it's tar, because all the lower chemical species are gone. You already knew some of those things, you just never thought about why there are tar sands in Alaska. It bubbled up out of the ground, the volatiles evaporated, and now we're full of tar, and we're just trying to reconvert it back and add some lighter hydrocarbons so we can make it flow again. But it all started out as liquid oil.
Back to Oil City. I went there in the late 90s. This refinery had been built around 1900, run by Pennzoil at the time, a major oil company. They had riveted steel tanks from the 1920s, and it wasn't anywhere near the size or scope of some big refinery in Houston or in California. I thought, how could Pennzoil run this inefficient small-scale little refinery in Oil City? I was there for two days. The second day it hit me. They could run it because they couldn't afford to shut it down. If they shut it down the EPA was going to declare it a hazardous waste site, and Pennzoil was going to have to pay hundreds of millions of dollars to clean it up. If you dug down one or two feet in the rock gravel in the tank farm where all these tanks were, you'd strike oil. They've been spilling oil there for 195 years.
The whole place was a hazardous waste site, but as long as you're in business it's not an EPA site. As soon as you go out of business it's an EPA site, and now the company has to pay the government to clean it up. Pennzoil is trying to clean it up themselves rather than let the government go in with their blank check and their great efficiency in doing things like this. But let me tell you the story that really struck me. How do you think they got the oil from Titusville down river to Oil City a hundred years ago? Student: Floated it. Floated it right on top of the river. They just skimmed it off at the other end. There weren't a lot of fish in that river in that section. But nowadays you see a little sheen of oil on the Charles River, and the EPA and the environmental police are going to sue somebody for a couple of million dollars for just a little sheen of oil out there.
In Canada they have hundred-thousand-dollar geese. I always say, hey, come over here to Belmont where I live, right next to the high school — we could make millions of dollars, they've got lots of Canadian geese. You walk down the sidewalks and you're stepping all over it. But they have these tar sand ponds up in Fort McMurray where they have the tar sands, and if a bird flies and lands in the pond, they'll get coated with oil and they will no longer have their water repellency and they will die. To encourage the tar sands people, who are making lots of money, not to kill these poor Canadian geese, they fine them $100,000 a bird.
A few years before, three birds had landed in the pond, and they fined them $300,000 for killing three Canadian geese. I thought, hey, I'll sell you two for fifty thousand. Now you go there, and as you're driving by you hear boom. They have little rafts out there in the pond that are propane cannons, basically just shooting off noise to scare the birds away, because it's cheaper than paying a hundred thousand dollars per Canadian goose that dies. These are externalities.
§5. Externalities: rare earths, magnets, and tobacco [32:04]
What are some other externalities? Student: Farming, smoking. Smoking is an externality. I'm not sure that immediately I can think about how to tie that into material science. Actually I can. When I was department head, Nick Grant was a faculty member in the department, and he was trying to get some research money. He was well into his 80s. He was going to get some money from one of the tobacco companies, because he made metal powders all his life, and they wanted him to make some powders of different composition to absorb the smoke. So the cigarettes might have metal powders — rather than activated charcoal. They were going to give him hundreds of thousands of dollars. Here we're trying to raise research money from the government — these guys were just floating in money. Even in smoking there's some material science somewhere.
How many of you have heard or worked on rare earth materials? I read the papers about what happened in rare earth materials about four or five years ago. Student: [comment on China]. It's not that China has all the reserves of rare earth materials, but they have tremendous mineral reserves of rare earths. As they started improving their economy, they started manufacturing lots of rare earth materials and cut the price so that all the other mining companies just shut down. They couldn't compete with the Chinese labor market for rare earth materials.
Then there was a little political fight with Japan — which is an externality — over some of the islands in between, and so the Chinese decided to be punitive and cut off rare earths to Sumitomo Metals. The only place in the world that you can buy rare earths right now is China. They created a monopoly, not because they're the only ones that have rare earth minerals, but they had reduced the price because of the cheap labor rates and very good resources, and no one else wanted to compete with them. Then they used that political clout to essentially threaten the Japanese with a huge industry. What are rare earths used for? Student: Electronics. Specifically neodymium-iron magnets.
There was my example of a neodymium-iron magnet. There's also samarium cobalt. Why are these permanent magnets important? You're all too young to know. When I was an undergraduate, we got a field trip to General Electric's research labs, and they were making samarium cobalt magnets. This was before neodymium-iron-boron had ever been invented. General Electric had a huge project to make samarium cobalt. The problem with samarium cobalt — it's about half as strong as neodymium-iron-boron, but it was much stronger than the old alnico magnets which were around in the 1930s.
[Tom puts up an overhead.] Here's a plot from years ago of the BH product. What's the BH product for all you electronic materials people? B is the induced magnetic field, H is the applied magnetic field, and the BH product is how strong this magnet is — how many pounds of force it'll hold. In megagauss-oersteds — gauss is B and oersted is H — and this is time versus the BH product. So it's sort of the magnetic field squared. Induced and applied magnetic fields are related by the magnetic permeability. Maybe you learned that once but you forgot it. But you really knew it.
Basically it's B squared. Steels before the 1920s, alnico magnets in the 1930s, rare earth cobalt — this is samarium cobalt in the 1960s. It was the early 70s — here's samarium cobalt, iron, nickel, copper. That's about the time that I went to General Electric, and this stuff had a BH product of over 30 compared to the old aluminum-nickel-cobalt alloys, which you had on your little Etch-a-Sketch — remember the iron filings, and you put the beard on the man and mustache. That's the alnico magnets. They're not very strong. Then about 1980, General Motors Research Lab discovered neodymium-iron-boron, which is that little thing. Now they're all over the place.
Somewhere around 1980, when the Sony Walkman first came out — heard of the Sony Walkman? It was the first little portable music player. Had a battery life of about three hours. Why? Because you didn't have these big BH product magnets, and they wasted lots of energy generating the magnetic field to run the tape. The motor was consuming all the electrical energy creating an electromagnetic field. They had a core, but they were just generating heat because they didn't have a good strong magnet. If you have a strong permanent magnet, you can just add a little field to a big field and get very powerful motors that are very small.
When I was a kid I would rebuild a starter motor for a car — the thing weighed about 30 pounds and it was a great big thing. Anybody seen a starter motor on a car today? Inside your fist. Probably twice as powerful as the one I was rebuilding back when I was a graduate student 40 years ago. Why? Neodymium-iron-boron magnets. There are something like 15 pounds of neodymium-iron-boron magnets on every automobile in the world today. Power windows, power seats — every one of those dozens of motors has got neodymium-iron-boron.
And here the Chinese were going to take that away from me. Well, you can't take it away. How much would it cost to redesign all the starter motors on all the cars in the world? Everybody had to start paying these horrendous prices. All of a sudden the government's talking about, what are we going to do, are we going to retaliate? These are the externalities. Are we going to open up mines? They've been talking about opening up rare earth mines in California. We have resources for rare earths — if the price goes up, we can afford to open a mine in the United States. It was only when the price was down low that we couldn't afford to keep it open. We could reopen it. Just takes about a five- or ten-year lead time, and a billion dollars. But a billion dollars is nothing compared to that externality of the value.
The Chinese can get a little blip in prices, but they can't get a long-term price increase, because other people will come in to take over the market. So whatever you know about materials, there's short-term economics and there's long-term economics, and they're not necessarily the same. There are lots of opportunities to come along because of these externalities.
§6. Norm Augustine and socio-engineering [39:55]
That's what Norm Augustine's talking about here. Anybody know who Norm Augustine is — what his history is? Norm Augustine is one of the non-MIT members of the MIT Corporation. He was an engineer, he became chairman of Lockheed Martin Corporation, he became president of the National Academy of Engineering. He's a very articulate spokesman for engineering, and he's a very bright, very practical man.
He would do plots for the Defense Department showing the increased costs of fighter aircraft over time, and he predicted that in 2020 the entire Air Force budget would be able to purchase one aircraft at the current rate of increase in cost. This was in about 1980 — about 40 years later. Well, that's not quite true, but that's what the trend line was showing. If you plot everything on a log plot, everything intersects anyway. Then the entire Defense Department budget — Army, Navy, and Air Force together — would only be able to buy one aircraft in 2045. He was trying to argue that we need to lower the cost of production of aircraft, which they have done.
Augustine coined the term socio-engineering. This was printed in the National Academies magazine, and he talks about externalities. Externalities can be economic, they can be environmental, they can be political, they can be social. Anybody heard of blood diamonds coming from Angola? Civil war. The problem is, you can't always tell whether those diamonds came from Angola — but you can, if you're a really good material scientist. You look for the impurity content in the diamond. You analyze the impurities, and certain diamonds you can fingerprint to what geological region of the world they came from.
Before that, about the time you were born, there was Rhodesian chrome. Anybody heard of Rhodesia? Rhodesia was an east African nation just north of South Africa, and they have the world's best chrome ore. It's so good you can't reproduce it. It's the most economical. But they were having a civil war in Rhodesia, and the rest of the world was trying to pressure them, just like we're trying to pressure Syria right now because of their civil war. So they put an embargo on Rhodesian chrome. It's a lot easier to detect Rhodesian chrome than it is blood diamonds. Blood diamonds you've got to go in with some pretty sophisticated instrument. Rhodesian chrome you can sort of look at.
§7. Steel: Mesabi, 1945, and the U.S. industry's mindset [43:33]
Anybody ever heard of the Mesabi Range? Back in the 1920s and 30s and 40s the United States had the best iron ore in the world in northern Minnesota. It's called the Mesabi Range. It ran out throughout the 1960s. You could just break up that rock and feed it straight into the blast furnace. You didn't have to do any secondary processing at all. That was the best iron ore in the world. It goes straight into the blast furnace. Made the United States super strong in steel.
You know what made the United States super strong in steel in 1945? The United States controlled 75% of the world's steel production in 1945. Anybody can think of why? It was an externality. It had nothing to do with the Mesabi Range or great management. We had bombed out everyone else's steel capacity. Of course we were the only ones that had any steel mills left. We bombed Germany, we bombed Japan, Germany bombed Russia. We were king of the hill in 1945.
When I went to work for Bethlehem Steel in 1974, the managers who had been hired 30 years earlier were now top managers at Bethlehem Steel. We controlled 25% of the world's steel capacity. They still thought they controlled 75%. That was their mindset when they had been hired in. In 1962, before we had the Arab oil embargo in 1972, the price of steel was what the world's commodities were based on. U.S. Steel raising the price of steel was going to create worldwide inflation, just like oil does now. President Kennedy had a big standoff in 1962 with U.S. Steel and forced them to roll back their prices. He embarrassed them in public.
This is an externality, having to do with the metals business. A lot of the old guys in the steel industry said that was the beginning of the end of the U.S. steel industry. That's not true. It was when they hired those idiots in 1945 — that was the beginning of the end. Those idiots 30 years later still thought they controlled 75% of the world steel industry. They only controlled 25%. And guess how much they control today? 10%. I remember the week I left Bethlehem Steel — I worked in the research labs, which was a beautiful $600 million facility built in the 1960s, would be like a two or three billion dollar facility today. Sits on South Mountain just north of Lehigh University in Bethlehem, Pennsylvania. It was a Taj Mahal of steel research. The vice president was a graduate of this department, Don Blickwede, used to be on the visiting committee.
Bethlehem had looked at innovative things like nuclear steel-making. You could build a nuclear plant and use all that electricity from the 1960s, and you could make more steel than anybody could ever use. The energy coming out of a nuclear plant could be the equivalent of three steel plants. The idea was, at that point, nuclear energy was going to be too cheap to meter. Back in the 1960s they didn't think the environmental concerns were important. Anyway, these are externalities. If we're going to talk about material selection, you need to think about externalities. You can read what Norm Augustine said about this stuff. He's also a very good writer. He writes in ways that help people understand simple things.
§8. The World Trade Center paper and being quantitative [47:38]
If I knew how to teach it, I would try to do that for you too. I don't know exactly how to teach it, but I'm going to hand out a paper which out of my several hundred publications is the most referenced paper I've ever written. It took me less time to write this paper than any other paper I've ever written. About three hours. Two weeks after the World Trade Center collapse, the editor of the Journal of Metals called Joel Clark first — Professor Clark — and said, "Would you write an article on the World Trade Center collapse?" He says, "Well, why don't you call Tom Eagar?" So he called me. I was so sick of hearing people tell me in the newspapers, "This fire was so hot that it melted steel."
Anyone who's ever been to a fire scene knows that you don't melt steel in a fire. Anybody who ever heard about Sir Henry Bessemer — who taught us how to melt steel in 1856, which brought in the iron age — knows that you don't melt steel in a fire. But all the newspapers were reporting, "Well, the jet fuel was so intense" — bull. You could look at the photos and you know it wasn't that hot. Has any of you ever been to a steel mill, and you've seen molten steel? What's the color, is it red hot? Student: Yellow. It's yellow or white. 2500 degrees Fahrenheit, 1600 degrees centigrade, is yellow — red hot, yellow — white hot. You didn't see yellow-white on the World Trade Center building. You saw yellow.
That's just Planck's law — the color you get from a solid material. It's actually the sodium or the soot particles that are radiating yellow at you, or red if it's 900 degrees. You actually can look at colors and see the temperature. They call it color pyrometry, measuring temperature with color. So it's ridiculous. I ended up writing an article — the person I had in mind when I was writing it was a high school senior. I wanted to write it simple enough that someone with a little bit of high school science could understand it, but I wanted to talk about fundamental principles.
For about 10 years, from 2001 to about 2011, it was the most referenced article on the World Trade Center. If you Googled "WTC collapse," it was the number one hit for about 10 years. Since then it's now down to like three or four. I go to Washington, people say, "Oh, you're an expert on the World Trade Center." Yeah, I spent three hours learning about it. And I'm an expert. Actually I was, compared to all those other people. The standards for scholarship are not very high out there. They might be higher here at MIT, but out there in the real world the standards for scholarship are not very high.
I became the brunt of the conspiracy theorists. The article came out in December of 2001. I wrote it the beginning of October, but it didn't come out for a couple of months. Originally I started receiving these emails from people who said, "Oh, the whole thing was a conspiracy between Israel and the United States to get everyone upset with the Palestinians or the Arabs." I thought, how do they get that out of — anyway, they were taking issue with it. When I taught my thermo course, they would do calculations. I got a book that one of the graduate students in this department gave me, because he was a conspiracy theorist, and there was an article in there that calculated the maximum temperature of the fire was 500 degrees Fahrenheit. That's not even good enough to cook a good pizza. I knew from the yellow it was actually around 900, and you'll see the reasons I give you thermodynamically in that paper, if you want to read it.
People will throw out all kinds of things and never put numbers on it. One of the things you need to learn is how to put numbers on things. Challenge me when I say something — say, "Well, how do you put a number on that, and let's see if I can do it." When you do your presentations, try to be quantitative. Because Lord Kelvin said, "If you can't express your ideas in numbers, you haven't reached the stage of science, no matter what the matter may be." I would like you to learn a couple of things from this course. One is to realize that you already knew the answer. You already took all these courses at MIT, and they taught you enough that if you put it together the right way you can figure it out for yourself. You don't need a professor to do it.
The other thing is I'd like you to learn to be quantitative, to put numbers on things. If you do that, I promise you that you will be considered one of the greatest scientists and engineers when you get out there among the rest of the people who can't even count to five without tripping over themselves. You went to MIT, you can go all the way to ten without trying a second time. We'll see you tomorrow, and I'll get into more real materials selection.