Air Force engine research committee and Mach 17 / National Aerospace Plane

Tom's service on an Air Force engine-research advisory committee (~2005) where the Mach 17 air-breathing strike requirement was justified by the bin Laden ordnance-reach problem. Used to teach the divergence of military and civilian engine technology, and the implausibility of the National Aerospace Plane copper-skin / liquid-hydrogen design.

I remember serving on a committee back in about this time frame that was looking at how the Air Force should spend its three hundred million dollars a year in research money for engine development. It was a very interesting committee — there were about 40 of us on it. Two of us were materials people. A number of people were from General Electric, the chief engineer on such-and-such engine. One guy sitting next to me was the guy who developed the F100 engine for Pratt & Whitney, I think that's right. There was a problem starting in the 1990s: military technology for engines diverged from civilian technology, and the civilians went to high-bypass engines. You know what high-bypass engines are? I'm seeing a lot of nods.