ALVIN submarine pressure hull cost overrun
Appears at 3 points in 3 lectures.
Appearances across the corpus
Tom's role on the 2003–04 National Academy of Sciences study estimating the cost of a new Alvin submersible. Woods Hole's $6.5M estimate; Tom's $16M revised estimate; final actual cost ~$40M. Pressure hull fabrication identified as the dominant cost risk.
I'll do a little introduction since the people on the tape didn't see this before. In 2003 or 2004 thereabouts, the National Science Foundation wanted to know if they could afford to build a new Alvin submarine to do deep submersion science over the next fifty years or so. They commissioned a study from the National Academy of Sciences to look at future needs — mostly the future needs of the people who were going to be using the vessel. But they also wanted to know if the twenty-five million dollars they had in their budget was sufficient to build the ship.
The specific cost-estimation episode. Woods Hole estimated $6.5M ($193/lb); Tom estimated $16M ($400/lb plus margin); actual cost ~$37M ($~1,000/lb). Used to teach the discrepancy between Jason 2 cost-per-pound ($320/lb tethered unmanned) and Woods Hole's optimistic projection for a manned untethered vehicle.
I've served on a number of these — for the Army Ballistics Lab down in Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland; for the Alvin submarine, on whether we could afford to build a new Alvin. So I served on this one about bolting technology in a marine environment. Risk equals hazard times consequences — there's a book from Harvard School of Public Health, not unique to Harvard, on the risk and benefits of hamburgers and cheeseburgers. It's the probability of an event times the severity or consequences. There are standards on this stuff now, many of them starting with the military, who have had some pretty major disasters at times.